JOURNAL OF HEBEI UNIVERSITY (Philosophy and Social Science) ›› 2016, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (3): 152-160.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-6378.2016.03.023

• Original Paper • Previous Articles    

Judicial Corruption Game Model and Control Strategy Based on Corruption Risk

LI Shu jin1, MA Xiu juan2   

  1. 1 Research Institute, The Central Institute for Correctional Police, Baoding, Hebei 071000;2 Library, Hebei University, Baoding, Hebei 071002, China
  • Received:2015-10-15 Online:2016-05-25 Published:2016-05-25

Abstract: The microscopic reason for judicial corruption lies in the legal staff pursuing the maximum individual benefits, and as the basic assumption of individual rationality, game theory is a subject that studies the decision making and the equilibrium problem of the behavior when people interact with each other. This paper constructs generalized judicial corruption game model based on risk to analyze the phenomenon of judicial corruption and from the point of view of game equilibrium, reveals the law of human strategy choice in the judicial corruption, and then puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to construct the mechanism of judicial corruption prevention and control system from the perspective of increasing the risk of corruption.

Key words: judicial corruption, non cooperative game, Nash equilibrium, control strategy

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