Under the Perspective of the Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization of Soft Budget Constraints on Local Government Debt Scale

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1005-6378.2017.05.012

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the national 31 provinces(municipalities)related samples in 2003-2014 panel data, using the static, dynamic generalized moment model(GMM)and threshold analysis of the influences of fiscal decentralization and soft budget constraints on local government debt scale, the results show that: under the background of Chinese decentralization, the impacts of fiscal decentralization and soft budget constraints on local government debt scale have positive correlation. But the influence of soft budget constraints on local government debt scale are based on double threshold effect of fiscal decentralization, when fiscal decentralization is on the low level, the increase of the soft budget constraint narrows the scale of local government debt; When fiscal decentralization is above a certain level, budgetary soft constraints increase the size of local government debt. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions for optimizing the debts of local governments.

Key words: fiscal decentralization, budget soft constraints, local government debt, panel threshold model

CLC Number:

F812.7

GUO Ping, JIANG Shan-shan. Under the Perspective of the Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization of Soft Budget Constraints on Local Government Debt Scale[J]. JOURNAL OF HEBEI UNIVERSITY (Philosophy and Social Science), 2017, 42(5): 76-85.

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