Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science) ›› 2023, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (4): 127-137.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-6378.2023.04.013

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The Stable Equilibrium Strategy of Ecological Compensation Responsibility Subjects from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

WEI Qiang1,LYU Jing2   

  1. 1.College of Economics, Hebei University, Baoding, Hebei 071002; 2.Academic Committee, Hebei University, Baoding, Hebei 071002, China
  • Received:2023-03-12 Online:2023-07-25 Published:2023-09-18

Abstract: The government,ecosystem service providers,and ecosystem service beneficiaries are the responsible subjects of ecological compensation,and the behavioral strategies of the three parties directly affect the evolution and implementation process of ecological compensation.By constructing a dynamic evolutionary game model for ecological compensation among the government,providers,and beneficiaries,this study reveals the evolution process of the game subjects behavioral strategies and their impact on the direction and speed of ecological compensation strategy evolution.Based on the simulation analysis of the stable path of behavioral strategy evolution,suggestions are proposed to improve the efficiency of ecological compensation implementation.Research has shown that in the evolutionary game process of ecological compensation,the ultimate evolutionary stability strategy of the government,ecosystem service providers,and beneficiaries is collaborative.Each entity has a high sensitivity to the participation attitude,expected benefits,and rewards and punishments of ecological compensation.The long-term stable development of ecological compensation requires encouraging active participation,increasing expected benefits,enhancing trust relationships,strengthening market supervision,improving the direction guidance of reward and punishment mechanisms,and continuously improving the social and economic benefits of ecological compensation.

Key words: ecological compensation, evolutionary game, stable equilibrium, responsible subjects

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