Fiscal Transfer and Local Fiscal Surplus ——Empirical Analysis Based on Interprovincial Panel Date

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1005-6378.2019.02.015

Abstract

Abstract: Tax share reform has strengthened fiscal centralization. In order to keep local fiscal equalization, central government offers a huge amount of fiscal transfer to local governments. Based on the panel data of fiscal surplus among 31 provinces from 1994 to 2015, this paper examines the effect of fiscal transfer from central government on local fiscal reserves. The results show that central fiscal transfer has significantly positive effect on the growth of local fiscal surplus, and central transfer payment has significantly increased the scale of local fiscal surplus. One RMB of fiscal transfer will produce 0.05~0.1 RMB increase in fiscal surplus. As the main form of program system, the special-purpose fiscal transfer has much stronger expansive effects on local fiscal surplus.

Key words: local fiscal surplus, central fiscal transfer, program system

CLC Number:

F810.4

WU Jin-jin, WANG Li-yan. Fiscal Transfer and Local Fiscal Surplus ——Empirical Analysis Based on Interprovincial Panel Date[J]. JOURNAL OF HEBEI UNIVERSITY (Philosophy and Social Science), 2019, 44(2): 100-107.

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